Abstract This dissertation consists of three essays on the topic of incentive effect in the joint production activities. The first essay aims to determine the optimal choice of sharing rule in asymmetric endogenous prize contest using a reward form in the Tullock framework. In joint production, sharing rule provide incentives for agents to expend more efforts. We will discuss the degree of competition in the sharing rules that leads to different level of dispersion in rewards. Delegation of production by a principal to multiple agents is theoretically explored in second part. We proceed with a two-stage delegation game under one-principal- multi-agent framework. In the first stage, the principal writes observable reward contracts with her delegates, specifying the portion of revenue left to agents and sharing rule between them. In second stage, the agents choose their own choices of effort levels simultaneously on individual behalf. We describe the reward scheme as the reward is proportional to a power function of the contribution and study the optimal sharing rule depending on reservation utilities, productivity of the agents and firm size. Though competition with a team can increase the incentive to work, the fierce competition has negative effects such as unwilling to participate and sabotage action in the team. In the third essay, we discuss the possibility of using the hierarchical structure with coalitions to reduce disincentive impacts of competition. We discuss all the coalition possibilities with 4 agents in joint production framework. The principal partitions agents into different coalitions and decides the inter-group competition level. The agents choose their own contribution. Meanwhile, the agents' efforts not only enter their intergroup competition, but directly enter intra-group competition.