Abstract The expansion of legalized casinos, especially in Asia, has been very fast after the 1990s. However, the legalization process has been uncertain among the different countries. Therefore, an interesting question has arisen on why some countries can legalize casino gambling while others are not able to do so. This dissertation makes the first effort to provide a comprehensive framework on the political economy of casino gaming in Asia by using a micro-meso-macro framework. The casino legalization processes and their evolution will then be explored with respect to the interest groups (i.e., the community, government, and business groups), behavior of individuals of each interest group, and the potential path of the evolution of the legalization processes. At the micro level, an analytical model with reference to the public choice theory is developed, which shows that individuals will participate in political contests with respect to their expected income redistribution and emotional changes. Hence, the government can provide effective signals that motivate individuals in the beneficiary group, but neutralize the emotional values of those of the anti-gaming groups. At the meso level, an empirical model is developed to show that the involvement of interest groups is affected by different variables. The government is motivated to support legalization depending on whether they face more fiscal stress or desire foreign direct investment, while the motivation of the community depends on their positive acknowledgement of casino gaming, which is determined by a higher income and education level. Business groups, on the other hand, are motivated by improvements in the existing facilities. In terms of consequences at the macro level, an evolutionary game model is provided to show that there are two paths of evolution in terms of casino legalization/liberalization. On the one hand, if the perception of the general public is positive, the government can easily convince the community to give their support. If, on the contrary, the general public has a negative image of casino gaming, the government will probably not receive support for casino legalization. Consequently, in countries where the general perception of the community is positive towards casino gaming, effective government signals will increase support and casino gaming will probably be legalized. However, if the general perception is negative towards casino gaming, or the community is not sensitive to the government signals, the interests of the government cannot be realized, and the likelihood of casino legalization is greatly reduced. Keywords: Political economy, public choice, interest group, evolutionary game, government signal, casino legalization, Asian casino gaming