Research on Joint Liabilities of Company Promoters’ Dishonesty in Capital Contribution JIANG NAN Chinese Language-International Commercial Law Directed by WANG WEI Abstract For the purpose of enhancing the vigor of commercial transactions and promoting the development of economy and society, Company Law of the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as "Company Law") has been modified in2013, deleting the articles regarding restrictions on the minimum amount of the registered capital and substituting the subscribed registered capital for the paid-up registered capital. This amendment has not only aroused the prospective investor's enthusiasm, but built the regulatory foundations for the further progress in commercial activities as well. However, company Law still reserves the article in the Chapter of A Joint Stock Company, demanding promoters to bear joint liabilities if any of the promoters fails to make full payments for the monetary capital contributions. To make things even worse, Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China (III) am ended in 2014 pursuant to the amendment of Company Law has applied promoters' joint liabilities of promoters' dishonesty in monetary capital contributions to both limited liability companies and joint stock companies under the circumstance that there is not any relevant regulation in Company Law. In form, creation of new rules in this judicial interpretation of Company Law has violated the reasonable principle of creating new rules in civil and commercial fields of law, therefore, it is unreasonable and illegal and may not be retroactive or applied in judicial practice. In content, it not only causes the confusion in application of promoters' joint liabilities, but also suppressing the social activity to invest. Although promoters' joint liabilities based on the Rule of Maintenance Capital will guarantee the interests of the creditors of the company, it does violate the principle of fairness by sacrificing the interests of promoters especially the honest promoters without considering whether promoters have the ability and obligation to warrant full payment of monetary capital contributions of each other. As a result, this paper will make a research on promoters joint liabilities on the condition of any promoter's failing to pay one hundred percent of the monetary capital contributions registered in the bylaw. In specific, this paper will center on Paragraph 3, Article 3 of Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China (III),and analyze the real purpose of lawmakers and the reasonableness of the provision from both form and content, providing useful suggestion for dealing with the relevant problems in reality and for designing the more scientific and reasonable system in the future. Keyword: False Funding, Joint Liabilities ,Promoters

出資不實下的發起人連带责任問题研究 中文摘要 為了進一步激發我國商事活動的活力，我國《公司法》於 2013 年進行修改，取消了最低註册资本額，並将其實缴登記制更改為認缴登記制。這一規定提高了潛在投資者的積極性，從制度上為我國商事活動的快速發展提供了保障。但是修改後的《公司法》仍在股份有限公司章節保留了要求其他發起人在發起人货幣出資不實的情况下承擔連帶責任的規定；之後，2014 年修改的《公司法司法解釋(三)》在《公司法》沒有本源規定的情况下，将貨幣出資不實下的發起人連带责任統一規定到了有限責任公司和股份有限公司中，要求其他起人為未如實地履行貨幣出資義務的發起人承擔無過錯連帶責任。該司法解釋突破《公司法》的規定創制新規則，超出了民商事司法領域司法解釋進行法律規則創制的合理限度，不具有合理性、合法性，不應具有溯及力也不應在司法實務工作中適用。這一規定不僅造成了我國公司法領域關於發起人連帶責任規定的混亂，也在實際操作中給投資者增加了負擔，在一定程度上抑制了社會整體的投資積極性。雖然要求其他發起人為未如實地履行貨幣出資義務的發起人承擔連帶責任是資本充實責任的具體要求，並且能夠為债權人利益保護提供保障，但是不考慮發起人是否真正具有互相擔保出資的義務和能力，就以犧牲發起人利益尤其是誠信出資的發起人的利益為代價來實現債權人利益保護，顯然違反了法律的公平原則。因此，本文將對在公司發起人未如實地履行貨幣出資義務的情况下其他發起人承擔連帶責任的問题進行深入研究，圍繞最高人民法院關於用《中華人民共和國公司法》若干問題的規定(三)第 13 條第 3款的規定，從形式和內容上分析該連帶責任混亂的立法現狀、立法者真實的意圖和該條款内容的合理性，為現階段公司註册資本認繳制度下實務中出現的其他發起人是否愿承擔發起人貨幣出資不實下的連带责任以及在需要承擔連帶責任的情况下如何合理進行責任分配的問题提供參考意見。 關鍵字:出资不实，連帶責任，發起人