The Study on the Legal Regulation of Hostile Takeover - From the view of protecting the interests of the company founders Abstract Hostile takeover is a common phenomenon in China's acquisition market, especially when the stock market atmosphere is generally cold. The probability of hostile takeover comes to a substantial increase. From the analysis of the new case in this article to the recent speculation on the market, Vanke stock dispute, reflect the acquisition of listed companies in China has shown a competitive situation. Under the premise that the acquisition of relevant laws and regulations is not perfect, the hostile takeover and the target company's anti-takeover will consume too much money and energy of the listed company, which has a great negative impact on the future development of the company. With the gradual development of China's Internet economy, a large number of innovative Internet companies emerged. The importance of the founder is as Ma Yun in Alibaba. It is foreseeable that these companies will become the main force in the future. Hostile takeover in China's Internet economic must increase. The traditional way of using government forces to intervene in the acquisition can not adapt to the process of China. Therefore, to regulate or even inhibit hostile takeovers, is the future direction of development. Such as providing adequate anti-takeover measures, so that both parties in the hostile takeover can compete in legitimate rules. On the basis of the summary of the second chapter of hostile takeovers, this article begins with the third chapter to focus on the comparative study of the two major traditional capitalist powers on the legislation of hostile takeovers. The fourth chapter analyzes the dilemma faced by the target companies in China's hostile takeover by analyzing the legal basis and legal logic of the verdict from the perspective of the domestic "new plum case". Chapter fifth, based on the legal provisions and case analysis, points out the problems in the current hostile takeover of China. In the background of the new era of Internet economic development, the sixth chapter puts forward some suggestions and suggestions on perfecting the legal regulation of hostile takeovers from the perspective of protecting the interests of the founders of the company, and provides theoretical reference for anti - takeover of listed companies. Key words: securities law, hostile takeover, anti - takeover, shareholder right

论敌意收购的法律规制 ——从保护公司创始人利益角度出发 中文摘要 敌意收购在中国收购市场中已是普遍现象，尤其在经济数据下滑，股票市场气 氛普遍冷淡的大环境下，敌意收购发生的概率更是大幅上升。从本文所分析的新梅案，再到最近市场上炒得火热的万科股权争夺案，都反映出中国的上市公司收购已呈现出竞争激烈的局面。在上市公司收购相关法律法规并不健全的前提下，敌意收购与目标公司的反收购会消耗上市公司的过多金钱和精力，对公司未来的发展造成极大的负面影响。随着我国互联网经济的逐步发展，互联网创新型企业大量涌现。 这些互联网企业与传统的工业企业不同，他们依靠的是创始人的眼光。创始人的重要性就如马云之于阿里巴巴，马化腾之于腾讯。可以预见到，这些企业都会成为未 来拉动中国经济增长的主力军。敌意收购在中国互联网经济发展的大环境下，必须 通过法律层面来进行抑制。运用政府力量强行干预收购的传统做法，不能适应中国 的法治化进程。因此，通过法律规制来规范甚至抑制敌意收购，是未来发展的方向。 例如提供足够的反收购措施，让敌意收购中的双方都能在合法的规则内博弈。本文 在第二章敌意收购概述的基础上，从第三章开始着重对英美两个传统资本主义国家对敌意收购的立法规制和我国立法进行比较研究。第四章以国内的“新梅案”为视 点，通过分析判决书的法律依据和法理逻辑，分析中国目前敌意收购中目标公司所面临的困境。第五章结合法律条文和案例分析的基础上，指出目前中国敌意收购规制上出现的问题。第六章将站在新时代互联网经济发展的大背景下，从保护公司创始人利益的角度出发，提出了完善我国敌意收购法律规制的若干意见和建议，为上 市公司进行反收购提供理论参考。 关键词 证券法，敌意收购，反收购，股东权利