The independent director system, a mechanism originated from the US for company internal management, is of unique value on corporate governance and has been adopted by many countries and regions. Across the Pacific Ocean, a large number of Chinese listed companies are faced with many corporate-governance problems, such as illogical/irrational ownership structure, dereliction of duty by the board of directors and supervisors, since China is in the primary stage of the market economy development. As such serious problems are needed to be regulated and corrected, the independent director system with its effectiveness to solve these problems came into the vision of the legislators and was finally set up in Mainland of China for the listed companies. However, the independent director system which theoretically should be of a strong function, turned out to be just a pretty face in the Chinese practice and failed to meet that expectation, especially in the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, purpose of the thesis lies on why this kind of practical problem happened and how to solve it. The first part of this paper studies on the practical situation of the independent director system in China. According to the typical case study and empirical analysis, it has been found that the Chinese independent director system has the “Emptily System” problem in the protection of rights and interests of minority shareholders. Then, the paper analyses the reason why the “Emptily System” problem happened based on the study of the essential characteristics and the operation mechanism of the independent director system, finds that the Chinese independent directors are weak and inadequate in independence and specialty, with obvious defects on complementary systems, ultimately leading to the functional abatement of independent director system in practice. Then, the second part of this paper analyses how to choose the internal supervision mechanism in Chinese listed companies on the level of integral system selection, and clearly indicates that the coexist mode of the independent director system and the board of supervisors should be continued. The principle that relying mainly on the independent director system while supplemented by the board of supervisor should be adopted, in order to solve the conflict between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder easily. Finally, according to the analysis of the causes of the “Emptily System”, the third part of this paper puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem mentioned above. On the one hand, in the aspect of independent director system, suggestions including: 1, improving the stipulations regarding negative qualifications of the independent director and the number of concurrently provisions; 2, reforming the selection mechanism of the independent director; 3, elaborating the supporting system of the independent director’s right to know; 4, legislating the integrated laws for the independent director system; 5, enhancing the training mechanism of the independent director, should be adopted by the system itself in order to solve the problem of the independence and specialty. On the other hand, on the perspective of the supporting system, it should be reformed in enhancing the function of the independent director in the special committee of the board of the directors, at the same time, it also should perfect the incentive and punishment mechanism of the independent directors. Through the two aspects of suggestions mentioned above, Chinese independent director system can be improved accordingly, with the realization of its powerful function in the right protection of minority shareholders. Keywords: Independent Director, The Board of Supervisors, Emptily System, Causes analysis, Consummate System

独立董事制度，作为起源于美国的公司内部治理机制，在公司治理方面体现了其独特的价值，并为世界多个国家和地区所采用。身处大洋彼岸的中国，由于正处于市场经济和资本市场发展的初级阶段，大量的上市公司存在着股权结构不合理、董事会失职和监事会失灵等突出的公司治理问题，监管机构急需良方对此类严重的问题予以规制和纠正，而独立董事制度作为能够有效解决此类问题的治理机制，理所当然的开始进入立法者的视野，并最终在中国内地上市公司中建立了该制度。然而，理论上具有强大功效的独立董事制度，在中国内地%2B的实践中却并没有发挥出应有的作用，特别是在保护中小股东权益方面存在明显的“制度虚置”问题，成为了一个花瓶式的摆设。为何会产生这种实效性问题以及应当如何加以解决，正是本文研究的目的所在。 本文第一部分首先针对独立董事制度在中国内地运行现状进行了研究，通过典型案例和实证数据分析，得出了内地上市公司独立董事制度在保护中小股东权益方面存在“制度虚置”问题的结论。随后，在探究了独立董事制度的本质特性和运作机理的前提下，层层剖析了“制度虚置”问题的成因，发现了内地上市公司独立董事制度在实践中存在独立性弱化和专业性不足的问题，同时在制度配套机制上也存在着明显的缺陷，并最终导致独立董事制度在实践中的作用大打折扣。在明确了独立董事制度存在“制度虚置”问题并对其成因进行分析之后，本文第二部分从制度整体性选择的层面分析探讨了中国内地上市公司内部监管机制应如何选择，明确了内地上市公司应当继续现有的独立董事制度和监事会制度并存模式，并且应当实行以独立董事制度为主、监事会制度为辅的原则，以利于内地上市公司大股东和中小股东之间利益冲突这一主要矛盾的解决。 最后，针对“制度虚置”问题的成因分析结果，本文第三部分对此逐条提出了有针对性的修改和完善建议。一方面，在独立董事制度本身层面上，对于制度实践中产生的独立性和专业性弱化和不足的问题，应当采取：1、完善独立董事消极任职资格和兼任数目规定；2、改革上市公司独立董事选任机制；3、细化独立董事知情权保障机制；4、制定统一的上市公司独立董事管理法规；5、加强独立董事业务培训机制等方式予以针对性解决。另一方面，在独立董事配套机制层面上，应当在强化独立董事在董事会专门委员会中的作用和完善独立董事履职激励与惩罚机制等方面予以针对性改进。最终，通过以上两大方面的针对性完善，使内地上市公司独立董事制度在保护中小股东权益方面存在制度虚置的问题得到有效解决，真正实现独立董事制度应有的强大作用。 关键词：独立董事，监事会，制度虚置，成因分析，制度完善