Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (VAM) is a common investment in the field of Private Equity(PE) investment agreement. VAM in China during the ten years of development is very difficult.As the most important part of PE investment, VAM in foreign countries has been adept and had all kinds of academic research. Although the private enterprises in China have consistently sought after VAM, most of the research on VAM is still in the case analysis. This decade, there are the win-win case like Mengniu and the failure case like Taizi Milk, and the most famous Chinese VAM case called "haifu case". China is a statute law system countries, there has been no special provision for the effectiveness of VAM, so there are still some risks when using VAM.Investors should avoid signing VAM with target companies, or signing VAM involving fixed investment returns. The trial results of Haifu case ultimately affect the Chinese investment and financing industry awareness of VAM, led to the now most Chinese investors and shareholders only signed VAM. The author thinks that the trial results of Haifu case hindered the development of VAM in China, so the trial results of Haifu cases were carried out detailed and specific analysis of the law.This thesis explained the VAM`s concept, elements, type, mark, standard, condition, etc.This thesis solved many problems, such as: What is VAM exactly? How is VAM works? This thesis outlined the legal relationship of VAM, including the relationship between subject and object, the legal nature. To prove that VAM is reasonable, close economic and legal，this thesis comprehensively discusses the legitimacy of VAM, including reasonable, economical and legitimacy. Finally, from the judicial level and practical level of VAM in China's development has carried on the profound reflection, and put forward some suggestions.The national legislature should make laws as soon as possible, set the terms of the VAM. When signing a VAM, domestic private enterprises and PE can get convenient rights and duties, styles of VAM; reasonable rules for valuation, regulations of equity, terms of VAM; perfect exit channel.

对赌协议作为私募投资领域常见的投资协议与“赌”并没有关系，作为估值 调整协议，已经进入中国投资融资界十多个年头，但是这期间它的发展可谓一波 三折。对赌协议作为私募投资最重要的组成部分，在国外已经运用娴熟且各类学 者研究甚多。虽然在我国的民营企业中得到了一致的追捧，但是关于对赌协议的 研究大多还停留在案例分析阶段。这十年间有蒙牛等企业的对赌双赢案例，还有 太子奶等企业的对赌惨败案例，还发生了一系列的对赌协议纠纷案件，其中对对 赌协议影响最深远的案例莫过于中国对赌第一案——“海富案”。在使用对赌协 议条款时候仍存在的一些潜在的风险点。采用对赌协议时，出让方应当尽可能避 免与目标公司进行对赌，或是涉及固定投资回报的对赌。“海富案”的最终审判 结果影响了国内投融资界对对赌协议的认识，现在大多数国内投资方只会与股东 签订对赌协议。 当年的审判结果对于对赌协议在国内发展从某种程度上来说是一种阻碍，所 以本文特别针对几次审判结果展开了详尽而具体的法律分析。对“对赌协议”的 概念、要素、标的、类型、标准、条件等逐条进行解释，解答了对赌协议到底是 什么，以及对赌协议是如何进行对赌的，综合论述了对赌协议的正当性等问题。 全文概述了对赌协议的法律关系，包括主客体关系、法律性质，并且在合理性分 析、合经济性分析、合法性分析中提出了自己的见解，证明对赌协议是合理的、 合经济的与合法的。最后，从司法层面和实践层面为对赌协议在我国的发展进行 了深刻的反思，并且提出一些建议，希望国家立法机关能在对赌协议方面尽快立 法规定协议中的条款的表述方式，在保护投资方和融资方的各方利益的前提下， 还能在闲置资本与缺钱企业之间建立起桥梁。希望本文能帮助国内民营企业与私 募投资公司签订对赌协议时，更方便地选择对赌标的、对赌方式，合理的估值、 股权规定和对赌条款，完善的退出渠道，让对赌协议应该在国内“万众创新，全 民创业”的热潮下迅猛发展。