When the European Commission first proposed a harmonised legal framework for takeovers in the EU, its aim was to facilitate takeover bids in order to create a more efficient and competitive corporate landscape and to further the single market. In the view of the Commission, a functioning market of corporate control required rebalancing the division of powers between shareholders and management in companies facing a takeover bid, Taking the UK, EU's most active takeover market as a model, the Commission proposed to assign the sole decisionmaking power regarding the bid to the shareholders, with management primarily playing an advisory role. This so-called board neutrality rule, however, caused much controversy among the member states, and it was one of the main reasons for the Takeover Directive's notoriously long adoption history, Failing to achieve consensus on this topic, the Takeover Directive was finally adopted in a “watered down” version, without a mandatory board neutrality rule, Instead, a rather complicated system of “options” was introduced, both at member state and at company level. Although it was clear that this approach would not create the same barrier-free market for corporate control the Commission originally had in mind, it was still hoped that it would be a step in this direction. At the very least, it was certainly expected that this approach would retain the status quo. This paper examines how the implementation of the Directive changed the takeover rules applicable to European companies. To that end, it analyses the pre-implementation rules regarding management's role in takeovers in all member states, and compare them with the current legal framework. It finds that, instead of facilitating the Commission's ideal of a comprehensive, mandatory board neutrality rule, the Directive has, in aggregate, likely had an opposite effect. It argues that there are signs of protectionist motives driving member states’ choices regarding board neutrality, and we fi nd that the system of company-level choices is ineffective in its current form. It proposes a simplified and more coherent board neutrality rule, solely based on shareholder decision making, Acknowledging that a system allowing management to prevent unwanted bids might have advantages over a pure board neutrality rule in certain circumstances, it argues that shareholders are in a better position to decide on the optimal rules for a particular company than legislators. Key Words: European Takeover Directive, board neutrality rule, reciprocity in takeovers, takeover defences, poison pill, ownership structure, contestability of corporate control.

为了便利收购活动，以营造更具效率和竞争力的公司环境，以及进步推动欧盟市场的一体化进程，欧盟委员会致力于推动在欧盟范围内统一关于收购的法律制度。欧盟委员会认为通过重新分配在面对收购要约时目标公司的董事会和股东之间的权利，可以促进公司控制权市场的发展。英国是欧盟中并购活动最活跃的成员国。基于英国的经验，欧盟委员会希望域内上市公司在面对收购要约时股东会享有排他地决策权，管理层仅仅发挥提供建议的作用——这就是“董事会中立规则”。 关于“董事中立规则”成员国之间存在很多争坳，这也导致了“收购指令”的立法经历了漫长的过程。由于成员国之间没有形成共识，最终导致成员国转化“收购指令”的结果极大地削弱了“收购指令”的功效，最终并没有在欧盟范围内引入董事会中立规则。相反，引入的是包含成员国和公司两个层面的极其复杂的一种选择机制。显然，这一结果无法实现欧盟委员会最初谋求的欧盟范围内的更加自由的公司控制权交易市场，但是这一机制仍然被认为是实现上述初衷的一大步，或者至少这一机制并没有使得转化“收购指令”前的欧盟公司控制权市场的自由程度降低。 本文阐释了“收购指令”对欧盟成员国关于公司收购活动立法的影响。为了实现这一目的，本文研究了“收购指令”引入前，在各个成员国，管理层在公司收购活动中的作用，并将其与现行的各国关于收购活动的立法进行了比较。研究表明：“收购指令”并没有导致“董事会中立规则”在欧盟成员国广泛适用，相反，“收购指令”实际上降低了欧盟公司控制权市场的自由程度。本文认为，成员国的经济保护主义在其转化“收购指令”时发挥了重要影响，同时公司层面选择引入董事会中立规则的机制毫无实际意义。 作者主张一种更为简单的、完全基于股东决策的“董事会中立规则”。基于本研究的结论：允许管理层对收购要约采取抵抗措施将使得“董事会中立规则”无效，本文认为与立法者相比，公司股东更适合决定面对收购要约时董事会应当采取怎样的行动。 关键词：收购指令，董事会中立规则，互惠原则，抵抗措施，毒丸，股权结构，控制权市场