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UM E-Theses Collection (澳門大學電子學位論文庫)

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Title

Research on supply chain game analysis and revenue distribution algorithm based on information sharing behavior incentives

English Abstract

In view of the problems of additional inventory costs and inaccurate demand estimation caused by information asymmetry in the traditional supply chain, it has severely damaged the profits of all participants and restricted the overall development of the supply chain. From the perspective of game theory and information economics, there is a “principal-agent" relationship with asymmetric information among enterprises at each node of the supply chain. Information sharing may help the supply chain increase overall revenues, but it changes the original revenue allocation pattern. As a result, companies with information advantages see their enthusiasm reduced for collaboration due to insufficient incentives, and ultimately result in unwillingness to share information or even information islands. Therefore, new technologies and ideas are urgently needed to solve these problems. The blockchain technology with its advantages such as decentralization, transparency, traceability, confidentiality and immutability, etc., is widely accepted as a disruptive technology as a powerful tool to resolve information asymmetry. The introduction of blockchain into the information system for facilitating information sharing among enterprises at various nodes will effectively promote supply chain collaboration. The thesis takes the supply chain as the research object. First, it establishes the Stackelberg game model to analyze the optimal benefits in the centralized information sharing mode and the information non-sharing decentralized mode, and finds that benefits generated under the centralized information sharing mode far surpass that of the decentralized mode, before using MATLAB to numerically verify the proposed model and conclusions. Second, it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategy changes and influencing factors in the information sharing choices of supply chain participants through dynamic equations and numerical experiments, and verifies the research results through MATLAB simulation. Finally, based on the improved Shapley value, an algorithm model of supply chain revenue distribution with information sharing incentives is proposed, and numerical examples are used to verify the model, which proves that the revenue distribution algorithm can promote supply chain sharing collaboration and Pareto improvement to a certain extent.

Issue date

2021.

Author

Tang, Qian

Faculty

Faculty of Science and Technology

Department

Department of Computer and Information Science

Degree

M.Sc.

Subject

Business logistics

Blockchains (Databases)

Supervisor

Guo, Jing Zhi

Files In This Item

Full-text (Intranet only)

Location
1/F Zone C
Library URL
991010072622706306